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A New Foundational Crisis in Mathematics, Is It
Really Happening?
Mirna Dzˇamonja
Abstract The article reconsiders the position of the foundations of mathematics af-
ter the discovery of the homotopy type theory HoTT. Discussion that this discovery
has generated in the community of mathematicians, philosophers and computer sci-
entists might indicate a new crisis in the foundation of mathematics. By examining
the mathematical facts behind HoTT and their relation with the existing foundations,
we conclude that the present crisis is not one. We reiterate a pluralist vision of the
foundations of mathematics.
The article contains a short survey of the mathematical and historical background
needed to understand the main tenets of the foundational issues.
1 Introduction
It seems by all evidence about the differences between set theory and homotopy
type theory HoTT that there is a crisis in the foundations of mathematics. However,
neither mathematicians nor even the philosophers have spoken enough about it. The
preceeding crisis, happening at the beginning of the 20th century and sparked by the
Russell paradox, created many animated discussions and engaged a large number
of mathematicians- not necessarily ‘logicians’ (as mathematical logic as a separate
field of mathematics had not yet existed, properly speaking). All the mathematicians
were interested in foundations and so were many philosophers. That was the time
when mathematics formed a tameable, unified, body of research, and mathemati-
cians could easily understand each other. The folklore has it that Hilbert was the
last mathematician who knew all of mathematics, but he was not the only one: let
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us mention Poincare´, Picard and Von Neumann, for example. The discussion about
foundation of mathematics engaged a wide audience of mathematicians. Today, lo-
gicians tend to hold foundational discussions with very little success in engaging
the mathematical community. For example, mathematicians spent 358 years solv-
ing Fermat’s last problem. The solution, due to Wiles [34] could not have possibly
been the one that Fermat meant to write in his famous margin in 1637, as it involves
mathematical techniques that did not exist even in a trace form at the time of Fermat.
Could Fermat have found a different proof? If we prove that Fermat’s last problem
does not have a solution in Peano Arithmetic PA, which encompasses all the tools
available to Fermat, then it is pretty clear that Fermat could not have solved it. Some
FOM (Foundations of Mathematics) discussion groups seem convinced that this is
the case, yet Angus Macintyre seems to have proved that Wiles’ proof actually can
be carried out in PA [23]. However the general mathematical audience has not yet
noticed this ‘rumination by the logicians’, as much as everybody would really love
to know if Fermat had actually proved it.
The truth is that mathematical logic has become a very specialised subject, con-
sidered by mathematicians as an esoteric subject of little interest to their daily life.
Therefore, even the mathematical foundations, since they are immersed in logic,
are considered as esoteric. (It must be admitted that this feeling in the mathemat-
ical community is not completely decoupled from the rather dry writing style that
logic papers tend to have). The purpose of this article is, firstly, to recall that just
exactly the opposite is true, thinking about foundations is not esoteric and, if there
is indeed a crisis in the foundation of mathematics, then everybody should be con-
cerned. Not only the logicians and the mathematicians but also all the scientists,
who base their reasoning upon logic and mathematics. One cannot build a high-
rise without knowing how stable are the pillars.1 Secondly, in the main body of
the article we shall describe the foundational question under consideration in such
terms that every mathematician, philosopher of mathematics or computer scientist
can follow the exposition, with the purpose of engaging a wider community in the
foundational discussion. Lastly, we shall give our own opinion, calming the fire of
panic and arguing that the crisis is relative and solvable and that it brings us more
of the positive than of the negative information. We shall argue for a vision of foun-
dations that envelops this information into a new stage of the development of the
existing foundations of mathematics.
2 For a Mathematician
Many of our glorious ancestors in set theory in the 1960s and later put an enormous
effort to show to mathematicians that the fact that there were simple statements,
such as the continuum hypothesis2, about simple objects, such as the set of the real
1 This metaphor might be overused. But I still like it.
2 stating that every infinite subset of the set of the real numbers is bijective either with the set of
the natural numbers or with the set of the real numbers
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numbers, that turned out to be independent of the axioms of set theory - then almost
universally considered as the foundation of mathematics - should be of interest to
every mathematician on the planet. This effort does not seem to have been very suc-
cessful, even though the independence can appear almost everywhere, see [17] for
some early examples in various areas of mathematics. Well, the point is that it is
almost everywhere, and many mathematicians have had the reaction to withdraw to
those areas of mathematics that were immune to independence and to relegate any
independence to the inferior rang of ‘pathological’ objects. Infinite combinatorics-
pathological, uncountable measures- pathological, non-separable Banach spaces-
pathological, independence- “can’t possibly happen to me”.
Fine, but what if somebody tells you that your art of mathematics is going to
go the way of the games chess and go, it is going to be replaced by formal argu-
ments doable by a machine which can do it better than you or any other human?
That is how the specific program of formalisation of mathematics through univa-
lent foundations teamed with automatic theorem proving, presented by a winning
mathematician who invented it, looks to a naked eye.
Ironically, it is exactly those areas of mathematics most remote from indepen-
dence, that are protected from independence by their inherent definability and con-
structibility, which are in danger of this new formalisation and computerisation. For-
malisation of mathematics most often uses constructive mathematics. ‘Pathological’
objects in general are not constructive, they often rely on the axiom of choice and
further set-theoretic machinery, with no specific witness for existential properties.
This is what makes them prone to independence, but rather safe from formalisation3.
So, one way or another, foundations have not been kind to mathematicians, and it
looks like one should start paying attention and ask the question if the mathematics
we are producing today is safe from a foundational and existential crisis.
Ever since the 19th century most (or just many?) people have considered set
theory as the foundations of mathematics. This is in spite of the great crisis in the
foundations of mathematics brought about by Russell’s paradox in 1902 and the
subsequent introduction to mathematics not only of several different axiomatisations
of set theory4 and various very successful alternative approaches to foundations
of mathematics, such as category theory, type theory and the theory of toposes.
While it is clear, for example, that it is much more reasonable to do certain parts of
mathematics by using category theory, it has been known that category theory and
set theory with large cardinals are to some extent bi-interpretable (see e.g. [11]) and
apart from philosophical reasons, there is no reason for an ‘ordinary mathematician’
to take his time from his mathematical considerations in order to think if one or
another foundation fits better with the purpose at hand.
In 2006 a new kid appeared on the block. It is the homotopy type theory in-
cluding univalent foundations. These foundations are different from set-theoretic
foundations. In some respect these foundations appear to contradict the set-theoretic
3 although see later on Isabelle and see Mizar’s project website http://mizar.org/project/
4 In this paper we take Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC) for our basis and we freely
dispose of a sufficient amount of large cardinals.
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foundations. A great disquiet, or perhaps excitement about the newly proposed foun-
dations can be seen by the following quote by Michael Harris5 in [16]:
It’s impossible to overstate the consequences for philosophy, especially the philosophy of
Mathematics, if Voevodsky’s proposed new Foundations were adopted.
Our thesis is that there is no contradiction in sight, moreover, these foundations
complement the set-theoretic foundations. We feel that any suggestion of a contra-
diction between the two or the idea that either should or could be replaced by the
other comes more from a lack of understanding than anything else. We attempt in
this article to give a simple account of the most relevant developments in order to
demonstrate our thesis. We shall lead the reader through a presentation of the basics
of several different parts of mathematics and logic that have gone into the develop-
ments in question and sometimes we shall have to simplify to a great extent in order
to make ourselves understandable. The reader interested in the details will easily
be able to find them, either in the other chapters of this book or elsewhere in the
literature and references mentioned here.
3 On Set Theory and Type Theories
Set theory is based on the classical first order logic. Basic entities are sets and they
are completely determined by their elements: the Axiom of Extensionality states
that for any sets A and B,
[∀x(x ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ B)] ⇐⇒ A= B. 6
The Law of Excluded Middle holds and the Axiom of Choice is assumed (as we are
working with ZFC). This type of set theory was formalised by Ernst Zermelo [35]
and ramified in the work of Zermelo and Fraenkel, as well as Skolem. A detailed
history of the development of ZFC and some other set theories can be found in [12].
Univalent foundations are a vision of Vladimir Voevodsky of a foundational sys-
tem for mathematics in which the basic objects are homotopy types. They obey
a type theory satisfying the univalence axiom. They are formalisable in a computer
proof assistant and are constructivist. To introduce univalent foundations, let us start
by discussing type theory. We present the types together with the idea of a proof,
which is not how these concepts were developed initially.
In set theory, basic variables are interpreted as sets and atomic formulas are of
the form x = y and x ∈ y. Naive set theory in which every collection of the form
{x : ϕ(x)} forms a set, leads to paradoxes, the most celebrated of which is the one
5 a mathematician who does care about the foundations of mathematics
6 The intended meaning of the symbol ∈ is that it stands for the actual real’ membership relation. A
common misunderstanding is that this is the case with all models of set theory. However, the setting
of set theory in the logic of first order, does not allow to rule out models in which the symbol is
interpreted by other means. They have to be dealt by separate means, including the Mostowski
collapse theorem.
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developed by Russell in 19027. Presuming that B= {x : x /∈ x} is a set, we see that
the question if B ∈ B does not have a unique answer. Set theory resolved this issue
by various axiomatisations, in our case of ZFC by introduction of Restricted Com-
prehension by Zermelo in 1908. This type of Comprehension only allows formation
of sets of the form {x ∈ y : ϕ(x)}, that is, the comprehension of all elements of a
given set with a given property, into a set. Russell’s own solution to the paradox was
to introduce type theory. There are many versions of type theory, but the following
version from [12] is equivalent to the one used by Russell and Whitehead in [32]
in which they succeeded to give foundations of the entire extent of the mathematics
then known in terms of type theory.
In this context, each variable has a type, which is a natural number, and writing
xi means that x is a variable of type i. Atomic formulas are of the form xi ∈ yi+1 and
xi = zi. That is, a variable can only be equal to a variable of the same type and can
only belong to a variable of type exactly one higher. The Axiom of Infinity is added
to level 0 and Axiom of Choice at every level.
The advantageous formalisation power of type theory is to some extent balanced
off by the fact that is rather cumbersome to write mathematics in this way. The
reader may find it entertaining to contemplate the notions of complement or cardi-
nality in this setting.
For the homotopy type theory it is more useful to think of the Dependent Type
Theory, developed by Martin-Lo¨f starting from the 1960s.8 Although the original
idea of dependent types evolves from Martin-Lo¨f’s study of randomness in proba-
bility, we can see dependent type theory in a computational context, like a computer
language (this idea goes back to de Bruijn). It is particularly well suited for the
theory of proofs, as we shall now see.
Type theory does not have semantics, only syntax. The basic expressions are of
the form term:Type, for example x : N and y : R, which mean that x is a variable
of the non-negative integer type and y a variable of the real type. Such expressions,
variable typings, are called contexts. From this we can advance to proofs or judge-
ments using some predetermined rules. For example
x :N,y :R ⊢ x× y :N×R.
The symbol ⊢ means ‘proves’. In this judgement we can see a typical operation
on types, which in this case is the product of two. A list of all basic types and the
operations on them can be found on the slides by Coquand [5]. It is useful to think
of this as a category, in which objects are the contexts and the morphisms are the
judgements. This is called the Classifying Category and denoted Ctx. So, when we
7 Zermelo seems to have discovered the paradox about at the same time, although he did not publish
it.
8 In our explanation, we shall privilege intuition to exactness. A much more precise, yet still rather
compact, survey of Type Theory and Univalent Foundations can be found in Thierry Coquand’s
article for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [6]. A longer survey of these matters is in
the recent article by Daniel Grayson [15]. Another recent article, by Martin Escardo [10] gives
an entirely self-sufficient presentation of the Axiom of Univalence. We have partially followed an
article by Michael Shulman and its notation, [31].
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write
Γ ⊢ a : A
we consider a as a morphism from Γ to A. Contexts with variables are ‘types’ and
those without variables, where we substituted a variable by a constant, are mor-
phisms. It is exactly the way to handle the idea of substitution which makes this into
the dependent type theory. For example, we allow families of contexts, such as B
type, where we interpret
Γ ⊢ B type
as a judgement allowing to conclude from Γ that there is an object of type B (or B
is a type in Γ ). The intuition is that B ‘depends’ on Γ . The dependent types also can
be combined, for example
n :N ⊢Cn type
corresponds to “for all n we have an object of type Cn”.
9. We can think of the de-
pendencies as factor or slice categories, where for example the statement Γ ⊢ B
type corresponds to the existence of type B in the category Ctx/Γ , the category of
all contexts in which Γ holds, or precisely to the statement that B is a type in that
category. Shulman [31] states: “The point is that substitution into a dependent type
presents the pullback functor between slice categories”. Intuitively speaking this
means that substitutions behaves as we are used to having it, where ’free’ variables
can be replaced by other free variables of the same type.
These developments lead to a proof system by allowing deductions, which are
the axioms of judgements. These axioms come in two kinds: ones that allow us to
construct a type and others which allow to eliminate in order to prove equivalence.
This resembles, for example, the natural deduction, but in this context it is more
complex. An example of a deduction rule looks like this:
Γ ⊢ A type;Γ ;n : A ⊢ B type
Γ ⊢∏n:AB type
where the premise is written in the numerator and the conclusion in the denominator.
This model of reasoning is very formal and well suited for implementation on a
computer, hence proof assistants such as Coq. Choosing a particular collection of
type constructors specifies the rules of a particular type theory, that is, dependent
type theory is not a unique theory but rather a template for producing proof theories.
It is possible to interpret propositional logic in type theory, namely we interpret
propositions P as types with at most one element. P is ‘true’ if there is an element
in it (these are types of level 1). From the point of view of proofs, saying that type is
inhabited amounts to saying that there is a proof of that type. We can also interpret
9 Of course, type theory has no internal logic in the sense of semantics, but the operations of
product and join correspond to the existential and universal quantifiers, under the Curry-Howard
correspondence, described below. See [10]. The intuitionistic higher-order logic interpretable in
MLTT is often referred to as the internal logic of (dependent) type theory.
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sets, as properties (types of level 2)10. By a property of elements of a type A we
mean a judgement of the form
x : A ⊢ P : Ω .
Under this interpretation, we obtain the Curry-Howard correspondence [20] be-
tween the operations of intuitionistic propositional logic and (some of) the con-
structors of type theory. So theorems of intuitionistic propositional logic are prov-
able in the deduction system. The Law of Excluded Middle LEM does not fall into
this correspondence. LEM is addable artificially as a judgement, but then it tends to
cause difficulties in the execution of the proof assistants, although it seems relatively
harmless in Coq.11 There are proof assistants based on higher order logic, such as
Isabelle/HOL and Isabelle/ZF which are able to deal with AC and LEM. For ex-
ample, Lawrence C. Paulson in [26] mechanised Go¨del’s proof that the consistency
of ZF implies that of ZFC using the proof assistant Isabelle. The HoTT libraries of
computer proofs are based on Coq.
We note that the full Axiom of Choice is inamicable to the intuitionistic logic
in the sense that by proofs of Diaconescu [8] and Goodman and Myhill [14], the
Axiom of Choice implies the Law of Excluded Middle. In a model of dependent
type theory, the Axiom of Choice can be enforced on the level of sets, at the likely
price of losing the connection with the proof assistants. A very interesting article
about the relation of type theory and the Axiom of Choice is Martin-Lo¨f’s [25], in
which it is shown that when a certain amount of choice is added to type theory the
resulting theory interprets ZFC.
4 An Identity Crisis and Univalence
To explain what the univalence is, let us first discuss some intuitions. Frege in the
celebrated Appendix of his [13] (in reaction to Russell’s paradox and attempts to
solve it) stated that
Identity is a relation given to us in such a specific form that it is inconceivable that various
kinds of it should occur.
Indeed, in set theory, there is only one kind of equality, given by the Axiom of
Extensionality and in model theory it is well known that we can always assume that
the equality relation in any model is interpreted by the true equality.
Martin Lo¨f’s type theory MLTT builds up on Dependent Type Theory by intro-
ducing some new types, including universesU0,U1, . . . such that Un :Un+1 and the
10 This may look like type theory is a generalisation of set theory, as mentioned in some references,
but this is not true since set theory is not only made of objects but also of the underlying logic and
the axioms.
11 Andrej Bauer in private correspondence (27 February 2018) says “Coq does not loop if we
postulate excluded middle, it just gets stuck on some computations, and then requires human inter-
vention to get unstuck.”
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identity type IdA(x,y) for propositions x,y. This type is the type of proofs of equal-
ity between x and y, which are both of type A. So if this type is inhabited, it means
that the elements x and y of type A are provably equivalent. Another type, called refl
proves that any x is equal to itself. This setting gives rise to two different kinds of
identity: definitional A= B (for types) and x = y : A for elements of a type, and the
propositional one IdA(x,y). Furthermore, building on IdA(x,y) we can also declare
that any two proofs for this identity are equivalent etc., extending the propositional
equivalence to all levels of types. Then it is clear (in fact it follows from the rule of
identity introduction) that the definitional identity implies the propositional one, but
it is not at all clear that the converse should be true.
This problem, which is to some sense the completeness problem for proof theory,
was noticed early on by Martin-Lo¨f and others, who tried to resolve it by inserting
explicit judgements to this extent. However, in the full generality, this leads to para-
doxes. The sameness of the two notions of equality became a known problem and
search was open for more subtle models of dependent type theory where this same-
ness is true.12
Intuitively speaking, Voevodsky’s univalence fullfils this dream. It says that the
identity type Id(X ,Y ) is precisely the type Eq(X ,Y ) of equivalences (which we have
not defined), in the sense of being in one- to-one correspondence with it. To quote
[15], it offers a language for mathematics invariant under ‘ equivalence’. This in-
tuitive understanding of the axiom, present in most presentations of univalence for
general audience (hence this one), is somewhat misleading. Much is to be gained by
understanding a more exact definition of the univalence, which is possible to do by
following the short and exactly-to-the point [10]. The conclusion is that univalence
is a property of Martin-Lo¨f’s identity type of a universe of types. Without univa-
lence, refl is the only way to construct elements of the identity type, with univalence
this is also possible by other means. The univalence axiom states that a certain type
is inhabited, the univalence type. It takes a number of steps to build the univalence
type, for these steps the reader may consult §3 of [10].
Voevodsky’s HoTT is an extension of MLTT by the Univalence Axiom, using
topological insights which we shall describe in §5. It should be noted that the Uni-
valence Axiom is not a consequence of MLTT as there is also a model of MLTT
where it fails, namely any model of Streicher’s Axiom K (see [19]).
5 The Topological View
Vladimir Voevodsky came into the field in a rather round-about way, and one may
say, somewhat naively. Paraphrasing his talk in the 2013 Logic Colloquium in
Evora, Portugal, we learn that after obtaining a Fields medal in 2002, he was feeling
increasingly isolated in the position to publish any proof he wanted (due to his rep-
utation) and to have a shrinking audience of real readers (due to the complexity of
12 This leads to intensional versus extensional type theory and is a long and interesting story, see
[18] for more.
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the proofs in question). He realised that he was not alone in the situation and judged
that mathematics badly needed - computerised proof verification. Only then did he
understand that there already existed a vibrant community of researchers working
not only on proof verification but also on proof assistants. At learning of the relevant
issues, Voevodsky realised that the univalency question had appeared in a different
part of mathematics under a different name and that it had been successfully solved.
The field was homotopy theory and the key to the solution is the notion of an ∞-
groupoid (a notion that was already used by some other researchers in the logic
community, as it happens, see below for historical remarks). The main idea of Vo-
evodsky was to interpret the category Ctx as the homotopy category, so that types
become spaces and morphisms. Propositional equality then becomes the homotopic
equivalence and the structure obtained becomes an ∞-groupoid. Finally, Voevod-
sky’s vision become the foundation of mathematics expressed in the language of
type theory in which the objects are represented in an ∞-groupoid. This vision is
succinctly represented in Coquand’s Bourbaki seminar presentation [5].
For us here, let us briefly recall the relevant topological notions and their his-
tory, discovered and developed in 1950s by Daniel Kan, building on an even earlier
work by Henry Whitehead. We start with the simplex category ∆ , whose objects are
linear orders on a natural number n= {0,1,2, . . . ,n− 1} and whose morphisms are
(non-strictly) order-preserving functions.We fix some large enough infinite cardinal
number (may be a large cardinal) and consider all sets that have cardinality smaller
than that cardinal. This category is called Set. A simplicial set X is a contravariant
functor X : ∆ → Set. Simplicial sets form a category under natural (the word natural
here has a technical meaning) transformations and this category is called sSet.
The point is that it is a classical result in algebraic topology that a certain fibra-
tion sSet/W of sSet called Kan complexes is equivalent to the category of ‘nice’
topological spaces and homotopy classes of maps. Because of this fact one can,
when working up to homotopy, think of simplicial sets as of combinatorial repre-
sentations of shapes or spaces, of simplicial paths as paths on these spaces etc. Kan
complexes form a model of an ∞-groupoid, the formal definition of which requires
higher category theory, but which in essence deals with a category with objects of
every type n for n < ω and n-morphisms. The homotopy types of the geometric
realizations of Kan complexes give models for every homotopy type of spaces with
only one non-trivial homotopy group, the so called Eilenberg-Mac Lane spaces. It
is conjectured that there are many different equivalent models for ∞-groupoids all
which can be realized as homotopy types, some of which are known.
Grothendick’s homotopy hypothesis states that the ∞-groupoids are equivalent as
in the equivalence of categories, to topological spaces.
A central theorem of the homotopy type theory with univalence, and one which
gave it its name is the following:
Theorem 1 (Voevodsky [22]). Modulo the existence of two inaccessible cardinals,
it is consistent that sSet/W forms a model of Martin Lo¨f’s type theory with the
Univalence Axiom.
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In the proof one can also assume LEM on the level of propositions and the Axiom
of Choice on the level of sets. Working in this particular model is what became
known as the univalent foundations, although some other models were found later,
as we shall mention.
The revolutionary result of Voevodsky had some precursors and parallels, no-
tably in the work of Michael Makkai [24], Hofmann and Streicher [19] and Steve
Awodey (see [2]); Martin Hofmann’s Ph.D. thesis [18] already mentioned above, for
example, contains a study of the groupoid of intensional equivalences. See [33] for
a detailed historical description. It also has descendants, which are well worth men-
tioning. Another model of Univalence Axiom and with less consistency strength, the
cubical model, was found by Bezem, Coquand and Huber [3]. Work of Peter Aczel
[1] shows that dependent type theory for constructive sets has a much weaker proof
theoretic strength than that of ZF. Namely, this model can be done in constructive
set theory CZF with universes. This set theory is proof theoretically strictly weaker
than ZFC, and has the same strength as MLTT/dependent type theory (without the
Univalence Axiom). A corollary of the work by Bezem, Coquand and Huber [3] is
that adding the Univalence Axiom does not add any proof theoretic power to depen-
dent type theory. The story of the proof-theoretic strength of these systems is rather
involved. A lot of results and the history can be found in Michael Rathjen’s paper
[28] and, specifically on the strength of the univalence axiom, in the upcoming paper
[29].
Furthermore, the relation between this and the classical logic and set theory is
also very intricate. Work of Crosilla and Rathjen [7] shows that the proof-theoretic
strength of CZF+ LEM+universes is at least ZFC+ unboundedlymany inaccessibles.
So it is LEM that adds strength to univalent foundations.
6 Conclusion, Crisis or No Crisis
Much discussion has been generated by the advent of the univalent foundations and
this volume is certainly a forum for it, as is the HoTT book [27]. To certain extreme
fans of HoTT, some of them present at the conference “Foundations of Mathematics:
Univalent Foundations and Set Theory” in Bielefeld in 2016 which initiated this vol-
ume, this subject means the end of classical mathematics as we know it, as we can
just move to a model of univalent foundations and let the ever-developing libraries
of computer proofs do all our mathematics for us. A mathematician of the future
becomes a new incarnation of a chess player, not capable to come up with anything
weakly comparable to what a computer can do on the same subject. The less ardent
fans have called for a measured reflexion on the choice between this foundation and
the classical ones, implying perhaps the eventual adoption of one or the other. The
HoTT book states in the Introduction: “This suggests a new conception of founda-
tions of mathematics, with intrinsic homotopical content, an invariant conception of
the objects of mathematics and convenient machine implementations, which can
serve as a practical aid to the working mathematician. This is the Univalent Foun-
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dations program. ... we therefore believe that univalent foundations will eventually
become a viable alternative to set theory as the implicit foundation for the unfor-
malized mathematics done by most mathematicians.” Viewed from this angle, the
situation looks like quite a serious crisis in foundations, putting two foundational
programmes in a competition.
Our view is that this crisis is not one and that, as ever in mathematics, mathemati-
cal results speak for themselves. First, there is no obvious reason of why one should
choose to limit oneself to a specific model of mathematics, be it the simplicial set
model or the cubical one or, for that matter, the constructible universe L or some
other set-theoretic universe; the prevalence of consistency results in mathematics
has rendered us very careful on this issue. But there are also more tangible obser-
vations following from the above results. If a theory has the consistency strength
less or equal ZFC+ some amount between 1 and 2 of inaccessible cardinals, then
this theory cannot resolve any of the questions for which we know that a larger con-
sistency strength is required. This includes many questions in modern logic, such
as projective determinacy, the existence of a measurable cardinal, the failure of the
singular cardinal hypothesis and so forth. If we take the view that large cardinals
represent the ultimate concept of the ‘actual infinity’ or the ’higher infinite’, then
these notions cannot be formalised by univalent foundations13. On another topic, if
a theory has a much weaker strength than that same theory when accompanied by
the Law of Excluded Middle, then that theory cannot answer all questions which
need this law and cannot reproduce all proofs where this law is used. Some proofs
by contradiction have a translation which does not require this law, some can be
formalised, but the results quoted above show that this cannot be the case with all
such proofs. And much of modern mathematics uses proofs by contradiction. So,
there is no way of formalising into a computerised proof in HoTT all that is known
or will be known to mathematicians, even those who are not interested in the actual
infinity but simply in the use of classical logic.
Of course, there are and have been manymathematicians (Kronecker, Poincare´ to
some extent and Brouwer to some extent, for example) who have rejected either the
actual infinity or the Law of Excluded Middle or both. The fact is that much of what
they, in that vison, considered as mathematics is now within the reach of computer
formalisation. Is this a bad or a good fact? It is neither bad or good. Mathematics
is not about judgement but about furthering human knowledge and it recognises
facts as steps to further advancement. Computer formalisation is a big step forward
for advancing certain parts of mathematics and a big philosophical advance which
works together with, and not against, classical mathematics. The fact that human
beings invented the printing press did not stop the development of writing, it en-
hanced it, and the same is true of any invention (weapons excluded) of our various
civilisations. We should not fear that the computers are going to replace us- because
they are not- we should welcome the new insights that they will make us have.
We have already suggested elsewhere [9] that the solution of the crisis in the
foundationsmight be to recognise the illusion of that ontological the in “the founda-
13 By the ‘higher infinite’ we do not mean the uncountable, which can be formalised in type theory.
Rather, we follow the usage the reference book on large cardinals by Kanamori [21].
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tions”. The foundations are there to serve mathematics and not to bound its growth.
If we need different foundations for different parts of mathematics, so be it, as long
as we do not run into obvious contradictions. The foundations offered by set theory
and category theory (which in our own view are different even if bi-interpretable)
remain as important as ever, the univalent foundations have their place. 14 Mathe-
matics is also about intuition and it should be done by everybody in a way that max-
imises their own intuition, it may be ZFC for one and constructive mathematics for
another. For example, with our ZFC eyes, we may pick from the article [3] the fact
that there are Π 01 -statements that cannot be proved in MLTT + Univalence and can
be proved in ZFC. But, to a mathematician like Voevodsky it may be more striking
that there are statements about abstract category theory and abstract homotopy the-
ory that are intuitively constructive (and should not require strong proof theoretic
means) but that become apparently non effective, needing the Axiom of Choice,
when formulated in ZFC.15. When expressed in set theory, the proof requires the
Axiom of Choice, which may be counter-intuitive. It would then be natural to look
for a formalism where such mathematical fact can be stated and proved in a more
direct way, an intuition that it confirmed by the result about constructivity of uni-
valence in [3], which is the actual point of the paper from the point of view of its
authors.
In fact, a more careful reading of the history of logic than is within the scope of
this article shows that various encodings of the foundations have always coexisted.16
14 This view is easy to take for a platonist, which the author happens to be, who anyway considers
that all our mathematics is only a development towards the unreachable but existent world of real
Mathematics and that the creation consists in being able to reach further towards that goal. How to
do it is the essence of creativity. However, it does not seem to us that any of the known mathematical
philosophy positions contradicts the evidence for pluralists fondations as represented by the above
results.
A ‘natural hero to logical pluralist’, in the words of Greg Restall [30] is Carnap, since, still
citing [30], ‘for him logic is of fundamental importance to philosophical inquiry, but nothing about
this inquiry narrows the field of play to just one logic.’
15 We thank Thierry Coquand for the following example of such a statement: a functor which is
essentially surjective and full and faithful is an equivalence, as well as for the above comments.
16 Several readers of the first draft of the paper have commented that one should more didactically
stress as a conclusion something that emerges as evidence from all stated above. So I will take the
invitation to state what seems to me as an obvious conclusion, or more positively, a good beginning
for future reflection. Pluralism is the only reasonable and honest choice in the foundations of
mathematics today. Machines, including computers, bring forward human knowledge but do not
replace it and it is by embracing what they have to offer that we are going to advance, not by
positioning ourselves in camps in which ones fight with chalk and the others with computer chips.
Of course, we could explain and explain some more, but to quote Dusˇko Pavlovic´, from his
comments on this paper, which are so interesting and detailed that they could in themselves form
another paper
There are so many misunderstadings between good people for bad reasons, which it should
be possible to clear. But the conundrum is: the more we try to explain, the more words we
write, there is more chance for further misunderstandings. I think the only way to resolve
such a conundrum is honesty and trust.
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Let us finish by a quote from the masters who wisely predict the fate of founda-
tions of mathematics, in words that entirely represent our own view. Bourbaki writes
in the introduction to the first volume of [4]:17
We now know that, logically speaking, it is possible to derive almost all present-day math-
ematics from a unique source, set theory. By doing this we do not pretend to write a law
in stone; maybe one day mathematicians will establish different reasoning which is not for-
malisable in the language that we adopt here and, according to some, recent progress in
homology suggests that this day is not too far away. In this case one shall have to, if not,
totally change the language, at least enlarge the syntax. It is the future of mathematics that
will decide this.
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